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Abstract
Overbidding, bidding more than risk-neutral Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, is a widely observed phenomenon in
virtually all experimental auctions. The scholars within the auction literature propose the risk-averse preference
model to explain overbidding structurally. However, the risk-averse preference model predicts underbidding in
such important classes of auctions as all-pay auctions. To solve this discrepancy, we construct a structural model
of bidding behavior in sealed-bid auctions, one in which bidders may regret their decisions. Our model nests both
risk-averse and regret-averse attitudes and aims to explain overbidding in a wider class of auctions. We first derive
equilibrium first-order conditions, which are used for estimation and calibration analyses, and show monotonic
increasing properties of equilibrium bidding functions. Second, we carry out structural estimation and calibration
analyses based on experimental data from Kagel and Levin (1993) and Noussair and Silver (2006). With these
structurally estimated parameters, we test the significance of bidders’ risk-averse and regret-averse attitudes.
The estimation results show that bidders exhibit weak risk-averse (close to risk-neutral) and strong regret-averse
attitudes. Furthermore, regret-averse attitudes are significant when bidders anticipate losing. Calibration results
demonstrate that our risk- & regret-averse model can explain overbidding across all of the above IPV auctions.
Third, we simulate our model with the estimated parameters and obtain revenue rankings numerically. This
allows us to confirm the revenue supremacy in all-pay auctions reported in experimental auction literature. We
discuss extensions to asymmetric and Common-Value (CV) auctions in our online Appendix.
Key Words and Phrases:
Overbidding, Risk Aversion, Anticipated/Expected Regret, Auction Rule Dependent, Auction Designs
∗The authors would like state their great appreciation for experimental auction datasets provided by John Kagel, Dan Levin, Charles
Noussair, and Jonathon Silver. Without their datasets, we would not have been able to realize this research. The authors also thank
Hugo Hopenhayn, Rosa Matzkin, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Isabelle Perrigne, John Riley, and Quang Vuong for their helpful comments
through various stages of this project. Yoshimoto remains indebted to his advisors, Ichiro Obara, Connan Snider, Jinyong Hahn, and
Daniel Ackerberg for their support to improve this paper. Any errors are our own.
†Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin: th925@eco.utexas.edu
‡Job Market Candidate, Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles: hisayoshimoto@ucla.edu (corresponding
author)
1
1 Introduction
In this paper, we propose a risk- & regret-averse model to explain widely-observed overbidding phenomenon across
different auction rules. The proposed risk- & regret-averse model nests the canonically-accepted risk-neutral and
risk-averse models, and it predicts a revenue ranking that is consistent with experimental observations.
A significant number of experimental auction researchers report that bids observed in sealed-bid auction experi-
ments are higher than predictions from risk-neutral Bayesian Nash Equilibria (BNE). Such experimental phenomena
is called overbidding, and observed in first-price auction experiments conducted by Cox, Robertson, and Smith (1982)
[9] and Cox, Simth, and Walker (1988) [10]. Scholars have observed many other instances of overbidding. Kagel
and Levin (1993) [27] noted observations of overbidding in first-, second-, and third-price auctions. Noussair and
Silver (2006) [34] discussed observations of overbidding in all-pay auction experiments.
Based on these experimental observations, researchers have been proposing theoretical and behavioral models to
explain overbidding. The literature offers three major explanations, and this research combines these three separate
explanations into one structural model. The first explanation, that bidders have a risk-averse preference, remains the
best-accepted explanation. Bidders prefer to raise probabilities of winning at the costs of higher payments. Higher
payments are associated with higher bids which are more than risk-neutral BNE bids. The second explanation is
that bidders have preference for winning, apart from their valuations of goods. Scholars refer to this preference
for winning as the Joy of Winning (JOE). The third explanation is that bidders are driven by anticipated ex-post
regrets. When a bidder loses, and if she is willing to pay the resulting price, the bidder perceives the resulting
forgone surplus as a loser regret. On the other side, when a bidder wins, and if she realizes that she overprices,
scholars see such overpayment as a winner regret.
1.1 Motivation: Discrepancies in Observed Bids and Risk-Averse Model Predictions
To clarify our motivation, herein we compare observed bids in experimental auctions and theoretical predictions from
the risk-averse preference model. We demonstrate that the risk-averse model predicts both overbidding (bidding
above risk-neutral BNE) and underbidding (bidding below risk-neutral BNE), depending on auction rules. Then,
we illustrate discrepancies between observed bids in experiments and risk-averse model predictions.
Figures 1 to 4 depict experiment results in symmetric independent private value first-price, all-pay, third-price,
and second-price auctions (listing in the order of figures) from Kagel and Levin (1993) [27] and Noussair and Silver
(2006) [34]1. In their experiments, bidders’ valuations of auctioned objects are exogenously given (controlled) by
experiment administrators, but bidders choose bids by themselves. Valuations are from i.i.d. uniform distributions.
First-Price Auction Experiments: Figure 1 summarizes Kagel and Levin (1993) [27]’s first-price auction
results and indicates that significant amounts of bids are above risk-neutral BNE in both five- and ten-bidder fist-
price auction experiments. These experimental results perfectly agree with the theoretical prediction in Riley and
Samuelson (1981) [37], in which they proved that risk-averse bidders bid more than risk-neutral BNE. Therefore,
the risk-averse preference can predict bidders’ behavior in experimental first-price auctions well2.
1 We explain the details of their datasets in Section 6. We remove extreme outliers such as non-serious bids (close to zero bids). We
also normalize their data to [0,1] scale for comparison purposes.
2 Accordingly, first-price auction models with risk-averse preferences are widely applied in empirical auction research. See Guerre,
Perrigne, and Vuong (2000, 2009) [20] [21] and subsequent empirical studies.
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Figure 1: Kagel and Levin (1993): Frist-Price Auction Experiments
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(a) Frist-Price: Five Bidder Experiment Result
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Figure 2: Noussair and Silver (2006) - (a) Six Bidder All-Pay Experiment and (b) Calibrated Risk-Averse BNE
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(a) Noussair and Silver (2006) - All-Pay: Six Bidder Experiment
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averse parameter 1.25
All-Pay Auction Experiments: Figure 2(a) depicts the results from all-pay auctions from Noussair and
Silver (2006) [34]. They experiment with six-bidder all-pay auctions. In theoretical all-pay auctions, the risk-averse
preference predicts two different bidding behaviors, depending on bidders’ valuations, as illustrated in Figure 2(b).
A risk-averse bidder with a low or middle valuation bids less than risk-neutral BNE to avoid payments caused by
the all-pay payment rule when she loses. On the other hand, a risk-averse bidder with an extremely high valuation
tries to secure her winning payoff by increasing her bid and increasing her winning probability. As a result, a
risk-averse BNE bidding function single-crosses the risk-neutral one at very high valuation. Therefore, the risk-
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Figure 3: Kagel and Levin (1993): Third-Price Auction Experiments Results - Comparisons to Risk-Averse BNEs
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(a) Third-Price: Five-Bidder Ex-
periment Result
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(b) Theoretical Third-Price Five-
Bidder BNE with CARA Risk-
Averse Parameter 1.25
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(c) Third-Price:Ten-Bidder Ex-
periment Result
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averse preference predicts underbidding in all-pay auctions, except bidders with extremely high valuations. Figure
2(b) plots the risk-averse BNE. However, Figure 2(a) shows that significant amounts of bids in experiments fall
above risk-neutral BNE3. The estimated bidding function lies above the risk-neutral BNE. To explain this observed
overbidding, one needs a risk-loving preference, which is not consistent with other empirical economics findings4.
Since all-pay auctions have such important real-world applications as patent races and political elections, we believe
that the risk-averse model’s prediction inability in all-pay auctions poses a significant problem.
Third-Price Auction Experiments: Figures 3(a) and 3(c) illustrate third-price auction experiment results
with five and ten bidders. Third-price auctions, unlike other auctions, are hypothetical auctions never seen in the
real world. However, third-price auction experiments provide useful insights into bidders’ behavior, especially into
their risk-averse attitudes. The theoretical risk-averse model prediction is as follows. In third-price auctions, a
winner pays the value of third highest bid, and bidders bid higher than their valuations. If a bidder wins, a third-
highest bid can be more than her valuation, and her payment can exceed her valuation. Thus, payoffs in third-price
auctions can be negative. As a consequence, risk-averse bidders try to avoid negative payoffs by decreasing their
bids and lowering probabilities of winning. Therefore, the risk-averse preference predicts underbidding. Figures 3(b)
and 3(d) plot the risk-averse BNE5. By comparing the estimated bidding functions and risk-averse BNE, we observe
overbidding among lower valuation bidders in five-bidder experiments and among entire valuation bidders in ten-
bidder experiments. If one sticks to the risk-averse framework and strategic interactions, and if one wants to explain
these observed overbiddings in third-price auction experiments, one needs to accept the risk-loving preference. This
3 The estimated bidding function (by absolute minimum distance estimation) has a “jump” around valuation 0.6 to 0.8.
4 In particular, in the insurance literature, one rarely observes risk-loving behaviors.
5 The analytic bidding function with the CARA preference is derived in the appendix of Kagel and Levin (1993) [27]. The CARA
risk-averse parameter 1.25 is used to create Figures 3(b) and 3(d).
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Figure 4: Kagel and Levin (1993): Second-Price Auction Experiments
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
x: Signals (Valuations)
b:
 B
id
s
N = 5
 
 
Estimated bidding function
Risk−neutral BNE = Risk−Averse BNE = 45 degree Line
Bids observed in experiment
(a) Second-Price: Five Bidder Experiment Result
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generates two immediate problems. First, the risk-loving preference is not consistent with empirical literature
in economics, because we never observe such empirical evidences of risk-loving attitudes as negative insurance
premiums. Second, bidders in Kagel and Levin (1993) [27]’s experiments6 reveal a risk-averse preference in the
first-price auction experiment. Thus, we have preference inconsistency in bidders’ risk-averse attitudes. As in the
all-pay auction experiment, the risk-averse preference alone cannot explain overbidding in third-price auctions.
Second-Price Auction Experiments: Figure 4 depicts the second-price auction experiment results. In
theory, bidding one’s valuation is a weakly dominant strategy in second-price auctions regardless of the bidders’
risk-attitudes. However, the experiment results in Figure 4 demonstrate that bidders tend to bid more than their
valuations. Therefore, the risk-averse preference alone cannot explain the observed overbidding in the second-price
auction experiments78.
These comparisons between experimental results and theoretical predictions illustrate that the risk-averse model
alone cannot explain widely-observed overbidding phenomena across different types of auction rules. The risk-averse
preference predicts both overbidding and underbidding, depending on specific auction rules. This insufficiency of
the risk-averse preference concerns us about reliabilities of auction designs. An auction design with a risk-averse
preference model can provide opposite revenue predictions due to the model’s underbidding natures under some
auction rules. As a result, such auction designs are likely to be unreliable. To design better auctions in the real
world, we need to have a model that consistently explains overbidding phenomenon across a variety of auction rules.
6 They are University of Huston undergraduate and MBA students.
7 Researchers have developed such concepts to explain observed overbidding in second-price auction experiments as non-strategic
interactions and the existence of spiteful feelings. Among such proposed explanations, the most well-accepted explanations is the Joy
of Winning, where bidders obtain payoffs that are separated from their valuations. See Cooper and Fang (2008) [8] for an example. We
will return to the Joy of Winning in Section 4.
8 We concentrate on the framework of strategic interactions in this research.
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1.2 Contributions
Based on the above motivation, we propose risk- & regret-averse model in the rest of this paper. Our model nests
canonically accepted risk-neutral and risk-averse preferences in the auction literature. This paper makes two main
contributions. First, by numerical calibrations, we qualitatively demonstrate that the risk- & regret-averse model
can explain overbidding across a variety of symmetric Independent Private Value (IPV) auction rules. Section 7
reviews the calibration figures. Second, by revenue comparisons, we quantitatively demonstrate that the risk- &
regret-averse model predicts a revenue ranking among standard Independent Private Value (IPV) auctions as9
all-pay > first-price ≈ second-price > third-price.
This ranking drastically contrasts with a prediction based on risk-averse preference10, as our model demonstrates
the revenue supremacy in all-pay auctions. Table 2 in Section 7 summarizes the results of revenue comparisons. This
new revenue ranking is consistent with the experimental auction literature, especially results from all-pay auction
experiments in Noussair and Silver (2006) [34] and Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006)[22], who report surprisingly
large revenues generated in all-pay auction experiments.
1.3 Literature
Sizable amounts of experimental auction research have analyzed overbidding, and these analyses propose a variety of
explanations. Since we have already discussed Kagel and Levin (1993) [27] and Noussair and Silver (2006) [34] with
their experimental data, and since we focus on regret-averse attitudes among auction bidders, we here concentrate
on the three most-related studies with respect to regret-averse attitudes.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989) [14] is the first theoretical study of bidding that incorporates regret1112. Recent
papers by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kotok (2007)[16] and Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) [18] experimentally investi-
gate the effect of feedback policies on bidding behaviors. These studies explain observed overbidding by anticipated
ex-post regret. In particular, in Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) [18], they experiment with first-price auctions under
different post-auction information disclosure environments. Using the reduced-form regressions, they find signifi-
cant differences in bidding behaviors caused by changes in post-auction information disclosure policies. Bids are
significantly higher in the environment where winning bids are publicly announced at the end of each auction,
compared to those in a no post-auction information disclosure environment. Based on the reduced form regression
results, they assess and verify existences of anticipated regrets under different information disclosure environments.
Although we do not discuss differences in information disclosure environments in this paper, we recognize our risk-
& regret-averse model is the structural extension of Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) in the sense that we statistically
verify the significance of regret-averse attitudes in auctions.
9 Revenue computations are based on the uniform valuation distribution and with estimated risk-averse and regret-averse parameters.
10 With a uniform valuation distribution and with reasonable risk-averse attitudes, the risk-averse preference predicts a revenue ranking
as
first-price > second-price > third-price > all-pay.
Programs that compute revenues with risk-averse preference are posted on Yoshimoto’s website.
11In this research, we use terminologies (1) “Regret”, (2) “Anticipated Regret”, and (3) “Expected Regret” interchangeably. These
are all ex-ante evaluations of ex-post regret. Formal definitions of regret are in Section 3.
12 See also Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kotok (2005)[15]
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Figure 5: Roadmap of the Paper
We emphasize that we restrict our attention to strategic interactions among bidders. We acknowledge that one
may explain the failure to choose a dominant strategy by arguments at a cognitive level, such as imperfect reasoning,
or many other behavioral models. We believe such behavioral models are orthogonal to our research. Nevertheless,
we view them as adequate explanations of overbidding phenomenon13.
1.4 Organization of Paper
We organize this paper as follows. In Section 2, we illustrate bidders’ regret-averse attitudes with the simple first-
price auction example. In Section 3, we define the formal models of expected (anticipated) regret. In Section 4,
we apply the risk- & regret-averse model to the auction environment. We also propose several testable empirical
hypotheses. Section 5 discusses Independent Private Value (IPV) auctions with the risk- & regret-averse model.
In Section 6, we structurally estimate model parameters and test empirical hypotheses. In Section 7, we compute
calibrations and counterfactual revenue rankings. Section 8 concludes and mentions possible future extensions. A
separate Appendix discusses extensions to asymmetric and common-value auctions.
13We are confident that many behavioral models, such as level-K and quantal-response models, remain compatible with our model.
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2 Regrets: Simple First-Price Auction Example
Before formally introducing definitions, it is worthwhile to cultivate the intuitions behind regrets in auctions. In
this section, we consider a simple first-price auction example in which perceptions of regrets naturally emerge.
We consider a fictional auction story. Mrs. Robinson is a big fan of baseball and she participates an auction
where an auctioneer offers a vintage Joe DiMaggio14 autographed bat. This auction is in the sealed-bid first-price
format, and we hypothetically assume valuations among bidders are private, to simplify the explanation15. All such
information such amounts of winning and losing bids are publicly announced after the auction. Mrs. Robinson
evaluates the bat as worth $1, 000, and for some equilibrium reasons, that we will intensively investigate throughout
this paper, she submits a bid of $800. After such an auction, Mrs. Robinson ex-post experiences one of the following
three mutually exclusive events.
Event 1: Mrs. Robinson wins the auction but she overprices
It turns out that Mrs. Robinson’s submitted bid ($800) is the highest and she obtains the bat. However, from the
public announcement, she ex-post learns that the second-highest bid fell far below her bid, say $600. Then, Mrs.
Robinson ex-post realizes that she only needed to bid $(600+ ε) to win the auction, where ε is a smallest monetary
unit16. This means she ex-post realizes she overprices the bat to the amount of $800−$600 = $200. A regret in
this event is defined as the difference between an ex-post best payoff (which could be achievable if Mrs. Robinson
knew that the second highest bid was $600 before an auction) and a realized payoff (which Mrs. Robinson actually
obtains after the auction). If Mrs. Robinson has the risk-neutral preference, her regret is defined by
1000− 600︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex-post best payoff
− (1000− 800)︸ ︷︷ ︸
realized winning payoff
= 200, (1)
which is nothing but the amount Mrs. Robinson had overpriced17. Next, if Mrs. Robinson has a risk-averse
preference with a CARA
(
u(z) = 1
α
− 1
α
exp(−αz)
)
von Neumann-Morgenstern (henceforth, vNM) payoff function18
with a risk-averse parameter α, her regret is similarly defined by the difference between an ex-post best payoff and
a realized payoff 
 1α − 1α exp(−α(1000− 600))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex-post best payoff
−
(
1
α
−
1
α
exp(−α(1000− 800))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
realized winning payoff

 . (2)
Furthermore, if Mrs. Robinson has not only risk-averse but also regret-averse attitudes, meaning she amplifies
a regret (which is the difference between an ex-post best and a realized payoff) with an index function with a
regret-averse parameter γ, her regret is defined by
 1α − 1α exp(−α(1000 − 600))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex-post best payoff
−
(
1
α
−
1
α
exp(−α(1000 − 800))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
realized winning payoff


1+γ
. (3)
14Joe DiMaggio (1914–1999), a Hall of Fame baseball player for the New York Yankees.
15We will relax the private value assumption in online Appendix of this paper.
16 We follow the convention in auction literature. We assume that monetary units are continuous and signals (valuations) are drawn
from atom-less distributions. Ties happen with probability measure zero, and we simply ignore ε in discussions.
17 Some researchers call this event as “Money Left on a Table.”
18 We normalize a CARA payoff function so that u(0) = 0 and u′(0) = 1.
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We call numerical amounts defined by (1), (2), and (3) as winner regret in order to capture a winner’s perception
over a forgone payoff caused by an overpayment that could be avoidable19.
Event 2: Mrs. Robinson loses the auction but she underprices the affordable bat
It turns out that Mrs. Robinson’s submitted bid ($800) is not the highest and she loses the auction. However, from
the public announcement, she ex-post learns that the highest bid is below her valuation (which is $1, 000), say the
highest bid is $900. Then, Mrs. Robinson ex-post realizes that she underpriced her bid. In other words, if she had
submitted a bid of $(900+ ε), she could have won an auction with a positive payoff. In the manner similar to Event
1, a regret is defined as the difference between an ex-post best payoff (which could be achievable if she knew the
highest bid was $900 before an auction) and a realized losing payoff of zero. If Mrs. Robinson has the risk-neutral
preference, her regret is defined by
1000− 900︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex-post best payoff
− 0︸︷︷︸
realized losing payoff
= 100. (4)
Furthermore, as we saw in Event 1, if Mrs. Robinson has not only a risk-averse preference but also a regret-averse
attitude, her regret is defined by
 1α − 1α exp(−α(1000− 900))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex-post best payoff
−
(
1
α
−
1
α
exp(−α · 0)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
realized losing payoff =0


1+γ
. (5)
We call numerical amounts defined by (4), and (5) as loser regret to capture losers’ perceptions over a forgone
positive payoff that could be achievable.
Event 3: Mrs. Robinson loses the auction and the bat is not affordable to her
It turns out that Mrs. Robinson’s submitted bid ($800) is not the highest and she loses the auction. Furthermore,
by the public announcement, she ex-post learns that the highest bid is far above her valuation (which is $1, 000),
say the highest bid is $1, 300. This means she ex-post realizes that the bat is unaffordable to her. Here, unaffordable
means that even if she knew the highest bid was $1, 300, she would have had no way to obtain a positive payoff. If
Mrs. Robinson has the risk-neutral preference, her regret is defined by
0︸︷︷︸
ex-post best payoff
− 0︸︷︷︸
realized losing payoff
= 0. (6)
In this event, even if Mrs. Robinson has both risk-averse and regret-averse attitudes, her regret is still zero, because
a regret is defined by the difference between an ex-post best payoff and a realized payoff.
Intuitively, the concept of regret numerically converts the perception of “if a person knew the true state” stories.
Ex-post best payoffs provide reasonable reference points to describe potentially attainable payoffs that a bidder may
consider when she chooses her bid in an action.
19 Note that if γ = 0 (no regret amplification), (3) collapses to (2). In addition, if α→ 0, (2) collapses to (1). These nesting properties
provide testabilities in risk-averse and regret-averse attitudes. We will explore these testabilities in the empirical sections.
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3 A Decision Model of Anticipated (Expected) Regret
In this section, we define the regret minimizing decision rule proposed by Hayashi [23] that we use throughout this
paper. The regret minimization problems nest expected payoff maximization problems.
3.1 Definition
The formal definition of the regret minimizing decision rule is described as follows.
Definition 1 : Regret minimizing decision rule (Hayashi, 2008 [23])
An agent chooses an action b∗ with the criterion
b∗ = argmin
b∈A


∫
X

 supb˜∈A
{
u(b˜,x)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex-post best payoff
− u(b,x)


1+γ
dG(x)


, (7)
where γ is a regret-averse parameter, u(·) is a vNM function, A is a set of available actions, X is the set of entire
states that can be discrete, continuous, or both, and G(·) is the probability measure over a state space.
Notice that we define the integrating object as a homothetic20 index function with a regret-averse parameter γ. A
regret-averse parameter γ can be categorized and named by its sign as

γ > 0 : (i) regret-averse
γ = 0 : (ii) regret-neutral ⇐⇒ expected payoff maximization
γ < 0 : (iii) regret-loving
.
Three interpretations can explain this parameter. (i) If an agent is regret-averse (γ > 0), she tends to amplify the
difference between an ex-post best payoff she could obtain (which is achievable if she knew a true state is x) and
a payoff she obtains by choosing action b. (ii) If an agent is regret-neutral (γ = 0), she solves an expected payoff
maximization problem, as we explain greater detail shortly. (iii) If an agent is regret-loving (γ < 0), she tends to
diminish her regrets21.
Regret minimization problems nest expected payoff maximization problems22. If γ = 0, the portion of the ex-
post best payoff in equation (7) becomes a constant, and it can be removed from a minimization problem. More
precise, if γ = 0, we can write a regret minimization problem as
b
∗ = argmin
b∈A


∫

supb˜∈A
{
u(b˜,x)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant
− u(b,x)


1
dG(x)


= argmin
b∈A
{
−
∫
u(b,x)dG(x)
}
= argmax
b∈A
{∫
u(b,x)dG(x)
}
.
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected payoff maximization
(8)
In the last equality, we change a minus of minimization problem to a maximization problem. The last expression is
nothing but an expected payoff maximizing problem. This nesting property has significant empirical implications.
20 Because of a homothetic index function, the regret minimization problem is robust to an affine payoff transformation. A constant
part of an affine transformation is canceled out by the subtraction. A multiplication part of an affine transformation can be moved to
the outside of minimization problem.
21 We define a regret-loving attitude for purely theoretical purposes, and we view it is unrealistic to assume such attitudes.
22 If states are discrete, it also nests Savage (1951) [38]’s minmax regret decision rule. As γ → ∞, the regret decision rule gradually
emphasizes a state that provides a maximum regret and eventually becomes Savage’s minmax criterion in the limit.
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4 Auction Games with Risk- & Regret-averse Bidders and Empirical
Hypotheses
One can straightforwardly apply the concept of regret to the auction environment by specifying a state space to be
a signal (valuation) space. In this section, we define the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (henceforth BNE) equilibrium
concept with regret minimizing criterion in symmetric Independent Private-Value (henceforth IPV) auctions23. We
also introduce testable empirical (behavioral) hypotheses that we test in the empirical application sections.
4.1 General Auction Settings
One unit of the indivisible object is being sold via a specific rule of sealed-bid auctions, for example, first-price
or all-pay24. We assume the existence of symmetric equilibria with no reservation price. There are n bidders
participating in an auction. Each bidder i = 1, · · · , n receives a signal (valuation) xi, where xi ∈ [0, x¯], and x¯ is an
upper bound of signals which can be normalized to one. Let F : [0, x¯] → [0, 1] be the continuously differentiable
cumulative distribution function and f : [0, x¯]→ R+ be its derivative. Signals are i.i.d. and valuations are private.
We here focus on a symmetric equilibrium with a continuously differentiable and strictly increasing bidding function
denoted by β : [0, x¯] → R+. We denote bidder i’s signal as xi, and also denote the vector of opponents’ signals as
x−i = (x1, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xn). The payoff for bidder i (given her own choice of bid bi with her realized signal
xi and given that her opponents employ a bidding strategy β with their realized signals x−i) is denoted by a vNM
function u(bi, xi,x−i|β). For the simplicity of mathematical notations, we drop subscripts of bidder i’s signal and
her bid by denoting x = xi and bid b = bi.
4.2 Equilibrium Concepts
We now introduce the BNE concept in auctions with the regret minimizing criterion.
Definition 2 : Symmetric BNE with Regret Minimizing Criterion
A symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) strategy is a monotone increasing and continuously differentiable
bidding function β that satisfies
β(x) = argmin
b∈A


Ex−i



supb˜∈A
{
u(b˜, x,x−i|β)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex-post best payoff
− u(b, x,x−i|β)


1+γ


(9)
for all i ∈ (1, . . . , n) and for any x ∈ [0, x¯], where A is a bid space that is common to all bidders and u(·, ·, ·|·) is a
vNM function.
Here, we apply the standard symmetric auction BNE interpretations. Given other bidders employ an equilibrium
strategy β, bidder i minimizes her expected regret by optimally choosing her bid b, and her optimal choice b coincides
23We relax symmetry and private-value assumptions in online Appendix of this paper. Extensions to asymmetric and common-value
auctions straightforward.
24 Since Krishna (2002) is a standard reference in the auction literature, we try to follow his notations closely.
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with β(x). As we have seen in the previous section (equation (8)), if we assume regret-neutrality γ = 0, the equation
(9) collapses to a standard auction expected payoff maximizing BNE. In this sense, our auction BNE with the regret
minimizing criterion nests the standard auction literature. Next, we explore the intuitions behind this BNE.
4.3 Understanding Regret Minimizing BNE
In the standard auction theory, one derives a BNE bidding function by solving an expected payoff maximizing first-
order condition. The beauty of theoretical auction literature is that composing parts of such a first order condition
usually have clear economic interpretations. Researchers usually interpret these as marginal benefit and marginal
cost of increasing bids. In this subsection, we first review marginal benefit and cost analysis in an expected payoff
maximizing first-price private-value auction, which may appear trivial but holds great importance in fostering the
intuitions behind regret. Then, we examine a regret minimizing first-order condition that one can also interpret as
marginal benefit and cost.
4.3.1 Marginal Benefit and Marginal Cost in Expected Payoff Maximization
In a private-value first-price auction expected payoff maximization problem, the expected payoff (EP) for bidder i
(given her signal x and bid b, and given other bidders employ a strategy β with their signals x−i) is written as
EP(b, x|β) = u(x− b) ·Ex−i [ALLOC(b,x−i|β)] (10)
where u(·) is a vNM function and ALLOC(b,x−i|β) is a binary allocation function. The first order condition of an
expected payoff maximization problem is
u(x− b) ·
dEx−i [ALLOC(b,x−i|β)]
db︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal expected benefit of increasing bid >0
= −
[
−u
′
(x− b) ·Ex−i [ALLOC(b,x−i|β)]
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal expected cost of increasing bid <0
. (11)
We intentionally keep negative signs on the RHS for consistency in interpretation. A bidder i is choosing her optimal
bid to equate her expected marginal benefit (LHS, an increase in winning probability) and marginal cost (RHS, an
increase in payment) to maximize her expected payoffs.
4.3.2 Marginal Benefit and Marginal Cost Interpretations of Regret Minimization
Such expected marginal benefit/cost interpretation is carried over to regret minimization problems. Define a Regret
function R(·, ·|·), a winner Regret function WR(·, ·|·), and a loser Regret function LR(·, ·|·) as
R(b, x,x−i|β) ≡
[
sup
b˜∈A
{
u(b˜, x,x−i|β)
}
− u(b, x,x−i|β)
]1+γ
WR(b, x,x−i|β) ≡ 1w · R(b, x,x−i|β) and LR(b, x,x−i|β) ≡ 1l · R(b, x,x−i|β)
where 1w and 1l are binary winning and losing indicators such that
1w =
{
1 if bidder i wins
0 else
and 1l =
{
1 if bidder i loses
0 else
. (12)
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Since an object auctioned is indivisible, winning and losing are mutually exclusive events. Using this mutual
exclusivity, we can decompose a regret function as
R(b, x,x−i|β) = WR(b, x,x−i|β) + LR(b, x,x−i|β).
Then, one can rewrite the Definition 2 (equation (9)) as
β(x) = argmin
b∈A

Ex−i [R(b, x,x−i|β)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected regret

 = argminb∈A

Ex−i [WR(b, x,x−i|β)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected winner regret
+ Ex−i [LR(b, x,x−i|β)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected loser regret

 .
One can take a derivative to minimize her expected regret and, thus, solve following first order condition equation,
MELR(bi, x|β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal benefit of increasing bid
= − MEWR(bi, x|β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal cost of increasing bid
where
MELR(b, x|β) ≡
d
db
Ex−i [LR(b, x,x−i|β)] and MEWR(b, x|β) ≡
d
db
Ex−i [WR(b, x,x−i|β)]
represent Marginal Expected Winner Regret (MEWR) and Marginal Expected Loser Regret (MELR) functions.
Note that these expected benefits and costs are for the sake of minimizing regrets. By slightly increasing her bid, a
bidder can reduce her expected loser regret (regret caused by underpricing) while she increases her expected winner
regret (regret caused by overpricing). In equilibrium, such marginal benefit and cost are equated. Using above
notations, we can rewrite the definition of BNE with regret criterion in the following concise way.
Definition 3 : Symmetric BNE with Regret Criterion (Marginal Benefit and Cost Notation)
A symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) strategy is a monotone increasing and continuously differentiable
bidding function β that solves
MELR(β(xi), xi|β) = −MEWR(β(xi), xi|β) (13)
for all i ∈ (1, . . . , n) and any xi ∈ [0, x¯].
In the case of regret-neutrality γ = 0, the equation (13) collapses to a usual (expected payoff maximizing) standard
auction’s first order condition. In particular, in the case of first-price auction, the equation (13) becomes (11).
4.4 Empirical Hypotheses
Based on the theoretical definition above, we now consider empirics with the regret BNE concept. Although the
theoretical definition provides us with the solid benchmark, sizable experimental literatures suggest the necessity
of modifications to explain empirical phenomena. In this subsection, we introduce empirical hypotheses suggested
by the experimental auction literature. Before moving to the detail of each hypothesis, we would like to emphasize
that our hypothesis tests are structural, which means we jointly test hypotheses without making strong assumptions
such as the risk-neutrality25.
25 In reduced form analysis, making strong assumptions before testing hypotheses is often inevitable. For example, an experimental
researcher may claim that some experimental phenomena are statistically significant given the assumption of bidders’ risk-neutrality.
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4.4.1 Relaxing the Symmetry between Winner and Loser Regrets
The first empirical modification comes from the question about the symmetry between winner and loser regrets. In
real-world auctions, bidders may or may not perceive winner and loser regrets equally, and one should empirically
test the symmetry in regrets. In addition, Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) [18] report asymmetry in regret-averse
attitudes with their experimental private-value first-price auction data in the reduced form fashions26. Motivated
by their findings, we modify the definition of BNE to make the asymmetry in regret-averse attitudes testable.
Definition 4 : BNE with Winner and Loser Regrets
A symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium strategy is a monotone increasing and continuous bidding function β that
satisfies
β(x) = argmin
b∈A

Ex−i

[sup
b˜∈A
{
u(b˜, x,x−i|β)
}
− u(b, x,x−i|β)
]1+1w·γw+·1lγl

 (14)
where 1w and 1l are winning and losing indicator defined in the equation (12), γw is a winner-regret parameter,
and γl is a losing-regret parameter.
The difference between equation (9) and (14) is that a regret is amplified by 1 + γ in equation (9), while it is
amplified by 1+ γw · 1w + γl · 1l in equation (14)
27. The equation (14) literally means that bidders in auctions may
percept their regrets in winning and losing events differently, in terms of the regret amplification with homothetic
index function28. Definition 4 provides an advantage in that symmetry in regret becomes testable by Hypothesis
2 below. Based on Definition 4, we now propose several empirically testable hypotheses that we will investigate in
empirical sections. The first hypothesis tests the existence of bidders’ regret-averse attitudes.
Hypothesis 1 : Expected Utility Maximization
H1n : γw + γl = 0 (Bidders are Expected Payoff Maximizer)
H1a : γw + γl > 0 (Bidders are Regret Minimizer)
Hypothesis 1 is the amenity of the nesting property of the regret minimization problem. Next, we propose the
second hypothesis for the asymmetry of regret-averse attitudes as we define in the equation (14).
Hypothesis 2 Symmetricity in Regret-Averse Attitude
H2n : γw = γl (Symmetric Regret)
H2a : γw 6= γl (Asymmetric Regret)
The problem is that such a claimed conclusion depends on the assumption of risk-neutrality. Structural estimation researchers warn
that such a conclusion suffers from “the Double-Hypotheses Problem,” meaning that a testing result in one hypothesis depends on the
assumption of another hypothesis. It is worth noting that seminal experimental auction papers such as Kagel and Levin (1993) [27] and
Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) [18] are avoiding such problems by carefully designing their experiments.
26 We recognize our hypotheses are structurally testing and verifying Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) [18]’s experimental findings.
27 We assume an object auctioned is indivisible, so winning and losing status are mutual exclusive.
28 In empirical sections, bidders in various experiments reveal significant loser regrets (γl > 0, statistically), while we cannot reject
γw = 0.
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The third hypothesis is testing the risk neutrality by investigating the concavity parameter in a payoff function u(·).
Hypothesis 3 : Risk-Neutrality
If we choose a CARA29 v(x) = 1
α
− 1
α
exp(−αx)
H3n : α = 0 (Risk-Neutral)
H3a : α > 0 (Risk-Averse)
4.4.2 Joy of Winning
The well-known overbidding phenomenon in second-price sealed-bid auctions motivates the next hypothesis. Ex-
perimental auction literature reports that bidders in private-value second-price auction experiments typically bid
higher than their valuations, despite the strategy to bid their valuations serves as a weakly dominant strategy with
the expected payoff maximizing criterion (as we will see soon, bidding their valuations also serves as a weakly
dominant strategy with the regret minimizing criterion). Based on such experimental observations, experimental
and empirical researchers takes stances of either (1) assuming a Joy of Winning30 with perfectly rational bidders
or (2) consider bounded-rationality models31. In this paper, we take the stance of (1). Nevertheless, we do believe
our regret minimizing model is compatible with the literature derived from (2). Here, we would like to clarify the
following point; we include a Joy of Winning parameter not to serve as a trivial explanation of overbidding across a
variety of auctions, but rather to verify the fact that regret-averse attitudes still play important roles in explaining
overbidding phenomena even after we include the Joy of Winning. In the empirical section of this paper, we will
statistically verify existences of both regret-averse attitudes and Joy of Winning. The following is the definition of
Joy of Winning.
Definition 5 : Joy of Winning
The payoff function takes a form of
u(bi, x,x−i|β) =
{
v(x− P (b,x−i|β) + J) : if bidder i wins
v(−P (b,x−i|β)) : if bidder i loses
where v(·) is a vNM function, J is the Joy of Winning parameter, and P (b,x−i|β) is a payment function that
depends on an auction’s rule.
The advantage of this specific form of payoff function is that one can interpret the Joy of Winning in monetary
terms. We now propose the fourth hypothesis to test the existence of the Joy of Winning in the bidders’ payoff
function.
29 We choose not CRRA but CARA payoff function to deal with negative payoffs in third-price and all-pay auctions. Note that the
CARA payoff function v(x) = 1
α
− 1
α
exp(−αx) gradually become linear as α→ 0. In the limit, v(x) becomes a 45 degree line.
30 For example, see Ertac, Hortascu, and Roberts (2010) [13]. Some experimental researchers reports the existence of “spite,” which
is observationally equivalent to Job of Winning under many circumstances.
31 For example, the logit distribution based quantile response model (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) [30]) and the cognitive hierarchy
model (Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) [5]). We strongly believe these models are compatible with our regret minimizing criterion.
15
Hypothesis 4 ; Existence of the Joy of Winning
H4n : J = 0 (No Joy of Winning)
H4a : J > 0 (Joy of Winning)
We test Hypotheses 1–4 in the empirical sections of this paper.
5 Symmetric Private-Value Auctions
In this section, we investigate equilibrium characteristics of the risk- & regret-averse model among symmetric
Independent Private Value (IPV) auctions. We explore this section in the order of second-price, first-price, all-pay,
and third-price auctions32.
In the remaining sections of this paper, we use the simplified notation β1 = β(y1) and and β2 = β(y2) where y1
and y2 are the highest and the second-highest signals among bidders excluding bidder i. In addition, we use the
terminology “affordable” to describe a situation in which a bidder can win an auction with a positive payoff. In a
similar manner, we define “unaffordable” as a situation in which it is impossible for a bidder to obtain a positive
payoff. In addition, a generic payoff function v(z) can be normalized as v(0) = 0, although we do not use such
normalization to foster readers’ intuitions. Moreover, we use the notation I, II, III, and AP to indicate First-,
Second-, Third-, and All-Pay auctions.
5.1 Second-Price Auction (SPA)
We start with a second-price auction since one can easily derive the equilibrium bidding function by (weakly-)
dominant strategy eliminations. Payoffs in a second-price auction is specified by
u(b, x,x−i|β) =


v(x− β1 + J) if β1 < b︸ ︷︷ ︸
win
v(0) if b < β1︸ ︷︷ ︸
lose
where β1 is a highest bid among bidders excluding bidder i (note that we use the short-hand notations of b = bi and
x = xi). Even with the regret minimizing criterion, a second-price auction keeps the simple equilibrium bidding
function.
Proposition 1 In a second-price auction, a symmetric equilibrium bidding function βII is
βII(x) = x+ J
for all x ∈ [0, x¯].
We can intuitively prove this proposition with Figure 6. The horizontal axis measures an amount of the highest of
other bids, β1, and the vertical axis measures amounts of ex-post best and realized payoffs. In Figure 6, the left
(right) figure represents a case in which a bidder bids lower (higher) than x+J . The central figure represents a case
in which a bidder bids x + J . We define regrets as the subtraction of thin-dashed line (which is realized payoffs)
32 Third-price auctions are discussed in Appendix, as not all of readers are interested in third-price auctions.
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Figure 6: Regret in a Second-Price Auction: (1) b < x+J (left figure), (2) b = x+J (center figure),and (3) b > x+J
(right figure). Thin-dashed lines are realized payoffs, and thick-dashed lines are ex-post best payoffs . We define
regrets as the differences between these two lines in each figure; we plot regrets as the solid lines.
from thick-dashed line (which is expost-beset payoffs). As we see, regrets in the central figure (in which regrets are
zero over the entire region) weakly dominates those in the other two figures, in which regrets are positive in some
regions33.
5.2 First-Price Auction (FPA)
We investigate regrets in a first-price auction. Since a winner pays her bid in a first-price auction, payoffs are
specified by
u(b, x,x−i|β) =


v(x − b+ J) if β1 < b︸ ︷︷ ︸
win
v(0) if b < β1︸ ︷︷ ︸
lose
(15)
where β1 = β(y1) and y1 = max {x−i} is the highest signal among bidders excluding bidder i. We can define winner
and loser regrets in the following ways, as discussed in Section 2.
FPA Winner Regret:
WRI(b, x,x−i|β) =



 v(x − β1 + J)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex-post best payoff
− v(x− b+ J)︸ ︷︷ ︸
realized payoff


1+γw
if β1 < b (16)
Winner regret in a first-price auction occurs in a situation in which a bidder win an auction but she overprices. In
such a situation, an ex-post best payoff is attained by bidding β1.
33 We borrow and modify these fascinating second-price auction figures from Martin J. Osborne’s undergraduate textbook “An
Introduction to Game Theory.”
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FPA Loser Regret:
LRI(b, x,x−i|β) =



 v(0)︸︷︷︸
ex-post best payoff
− v(0)︸︷︷︸
realized payoff


1+γl
= 0 if β1 > x+ J︸ ︷︷ ︸
unaffordable
 v(x − β1 + J)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex-post best payoff
− v(0)︸︷︷︸
realized payoff


1+γl
if b < β1 < x+ J︸ ︷︷ ︸
affordable
(17)
The first row of equation (17) describes a situation in which the highest of other bids is above her valuation plus
Joy of Winning (x+ J), thus, an object is unaffordable to her. In this situation, she has no regret. The second row
of equation (17) is a case in which an object is affordable to her but she underprices and cannot obtain it.
In a first-price auction, expected regret takes a form
Ex−i [R
I(b, x,x−i|β)] = Ex−i [WR
I(b, x,x−i|β)] + Ex−i [LR
I(b, x,x−i|β)] (18)
where
Ex−i [WR
I(b, x,x−i|β)] =
∫ b
β(0)
[v(x− β1 + J)− v(x− b+ J)]
1+γw h1(β1)dβ1 (19)
Ex−i [LR
I(b, x,x−i|β)] =
∫ x+J
b
[v(x − β1 + J)− v(0)]
1+γl h1(β1)dβ1 (20)
where h1(·) is the unconditional density of β1. Note that, in the RHS of equation (19) and (20), we take integral
over other bidders’ bids34 to calculate expected regret. This is equivalent to taking the integral over other bidders’
signals after the changes of variable manipulations. By calculating the first order condition of (18) with respect to
b, and by substituting the symmetric equilibrium condition b = β(x), we obtain the following proposition (see the
derivation in Appendix).
Proposition 2 Symmetric IPV First-Price Auction Equilibrium
The symmetric equilibrium bidding function βI satisfies
MELRI(βI(x), x|βI) = −MEWRI(βI(x), x|βI)
for all x ∈ [0, x¯], where the precise form of the equation is
[v(x − βI(x) + J)− v(0)]1+γlg1(x)
= (1 + γw)v
′(x− βI(x) + J)
dβI(x)
dx
∫ x
0
[v(x− βI(y1) + J)− v(x− β
I(x) + J)]γwg1(y1)dy1.
The immediate consequence of Proposition 2 is the weak monotonicity property of βI.
Corollary 1 If γw, γl ≥ 0 and v(·) satisfies v
′(·) > 0, βI is weakly monotone increasing.
(proof) By manipulating the equation in Proposition 2, we obtain dβ
I(x)
dx
≥ 0.
34 Since this is a first-price auction with i.i.d. valuations, only the highest of the other bidders’ bids matters to bidder i’s payoffs and
regrets.
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Case 1 If γw = γl = 0 (regret-neutral), J = 0 (no joy of winning), and v(z) = z (risk-neutral) the equation in
proposition 2 becomes
βI(x) = x−
∫ x
0
F (x)n−1dx
F (x)n−1
which is the well-known risk-neutral BNE in a first-price auction.
5.3 All-Pay Auction (APA)
Next, we direct our attention to all-pay auctions that describe irretrievable costs such as research and development
(R & D) patent races, political elections, and lobbying activities. Since a bidder has to pay her bid regardless of
winning or losing, payoffs in an all-pay auction are specified as
u(b, x,x−i|β) =


v(x− b + J) if β1 < b︸ ︷︷ ︸
win
v(−b) if b < β1︸ ︷︷ ︸
lose
.
We can define winner and loser regret in the following ways.
APA Winner Regret
WRAP(b, x,x−i|β) =



 v(x− β1 + J)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex-post best payoff
− v(x− b + J)︸ ︷︷ ︸
realized payoff


1+γw
if β1 < b . (21)
The above equation is bidder i’s regret over overpricing when she wins. The winner regret in an all-pay auction is
identical to that in a first-price auction. The ex-post best payoff is attained by bidding β1.
APA Loser Regret
LRAP(b, x,x−i|β) =



 v(x− β1 + J)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex-post best payoff
− v(−b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
realized payoff


1+γl
if β1 > b and β1 < x+ J︸ ︷︷ ︸
affordable
( Type A)

 v(0)︸︷︷︸
ex-post best payoff
− v(−b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
realized payoff


1+γl
if β1 > b and β1 > x+ J︸ ︷︷ ︸
unaffordable
(Type B)
(22)
There are two types of loser regrets in an all-pay auction. The first row is the case in which bidder i loses an auction
although she ex-post realizes she can afford an object. By the all-pay auction rule, she incurs her bid b. The second
row is the case in which bidder i loses an all-pay auction and she ex-post realizes an object is unaffordable to her,
and she wastes her payment of b. In this case, since an object is unaffordable, bidding zero is her ex-post best
action. To simplify discussion, we name the loser regrets in the first and second rows as Type A and Type B. Also,
we denote Type A and Type B all-pay loser-regret functions as LRAPtypeA(·, ·, ·|·) and LR
AP
typeB(·, ·, ·|·) . Given that
other bidders employ a bidding strategy β, expected regret in an all-pay auction takes a form
Ex−i [R
AP(b, x,x−i|β)] = Ex−i [WR
AP(b, x, β)] + Ex−i [LR
AP
typeA(b, x,x−i|β)] + Ex−i [LR
AP
typeB(b, x,x−i|β)] (23)
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where
Ex−i [WR
AP(b, x,x−i|β)] =
∫ b
β(0)
[v(x − β1 + J)− v(x − b+ J)]
1+γw h1(β1)dβ1 (24)
Ex−i [LR
AP
typeA(b, x,x−i|β)] =
∫ x+J
b
[v(x − β1 + J)− v(−b)]
1+γl h1(β1)dβ1 (25)
Ex−i [LR
AP
typeB(b, x,x−i|β)] =
∫ β(x¯)
x+J
[v(0)− v(−b)]
1+γl h1(β1)dβ1 (26)
where h1(·) is the density of β1 and x¯ is the highest possible signal. In the right hand sides of the above equations,
integrals are taken over the highest of the other bidders’ bids, β1. These integrals are equivalent to integrals other
bidders’ signals after the changes of variable manipulations. Taking the derivative of (23) with respect to b and
substituting the symmetric equilibrium condition b = β(x) provide the following proposition (see the derivation in
Appendix).
Proposition 3 All-Pay Auction Symmetric Equilibrium
In an IPV all-pay auction, a symmetric equilibrium bidding function βAP satisfies
MELRAPTypeA(β
AP(x), x|βAP) = −MEWRAP(βAP(x), x|βAP)−MELRAPTypeB(β
AP(x), x|βAP) (27)
for all x ∈ [0, x¯], where the precise form of the equation is
−[v(x− βAP(x) + J)− v(−βAP(x))]1+γlg1(x)
1
dβAP(x)
dx
+(1 + γl)v
′
(−βAP(x))
∫ βAP,−1(x+J)
x
[
v(x− βAP(y1) + J)− v(−β
AP(x))
]γl
g1(y1)dy1
= −(1 + γw)v
′
(x− βAP(x) + J)
∫ x
0
[
v(x− βAP(y1) + J)− v(x− β
AP(x) + J)
]γw
g1(y1)dy1
−(1 + γl)v
′
(−βAP(x))[v(0)− v(−βAP(x))]γl [1−G1(β
AP,-1(x+ J))].
The immediate consequence of the above proposition is the weak monotonicity of βAP.
Corollary 2 If γw, γl ≥ 0 and v(·) satisfies v
′(·) > 0, βAP is weakly monotone increasing.
(proof) By manipulating the equation in Proposition 3, we obtain dβ
AP(x)
dx
≥ 0.
Case 2 If γw = γl = 0 (regret-neutral), J = 0 (no joy of winning), and v(z) = z (risk-neutral) the equation in
proposition 3 becomes
βAP(x) =
∫ x
0
y1 · g1(y1)dy1
which is the well-known risk-neutral BNE in an all-pay auction.
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6 Regrets in Independent Private Value Auctions: Experimental Evi-
dence
In this section, we structurally estimate regret and other parameters with experimental auction data. We first
illustrate the dataset from the laboratory auction experiments. Second, we explain the structural estimation that
is based on the widely used method proposed by Hotz and Miller (1993)[25] in the empirical industrial organization
literature. Third, we report estimation results. Fourth, we test hypotheses 1–4 to review the significance of regrets.
6.1 Datasets
Kagel and Levin (1993)
The first dataset of Independent Private-Value (IPV) auctions is provided by Kagel and Levin (1993)[27]3536. Since
we have plotted their experimental results in Figures 1, 3, and 4 in the introductory section (Section 1), we here
shortly summarize their experiments, and readers who are interested in details are recommended to read the paper.
In their series of auction experiments, they conducted first-, second-, and third-price auction experiments with two
different number of bidders, five and ten. In each experiment, valuations are drawn from the uniform distribution
U [0, 28.3]37. Since a bidder in a third-price auction can incur negative payments, the participation fee of 10 dollars
were given to experiment participants before entering laboratory. Results of auctions are plotted in the introduction
section (Section 1). Polynomial function estimations with order six to twelve with strict monotonicity restriction38
functions are also plotted.
Noussair and Silver (2006)
The second dataset of IPV auctions is provided by Noussair and Silver (2006) [34], in which they implement all-pay
auction experiments39. Noussair and Silver (2006)’s data are not used in our estimation, although they are used in
comparison analysis (in Section 7). Noussair and Silver focus their research on all-pay auctions with six-bidders.
Signals (valuations) are independently drawn from U [0, 1000]40. Since monetary gains generated by all-pay auctions
can be negative, 20 dollars of participation fee were provided at the begging of the experiment41. Figure 2 in
introductory section (Section 1) lists the results. We used polynomial of order twelve with the strict monotonicity
restriction to estimate the bidding function.
35 We appreciate John Kagel’s and Dan Levin’s generosity in providing the dataset for this project.
36 In this research, we delete (1) the initial 4 rounds of experiments to eliminate the learning effects and (2) the final 2 rounds to
eliminate the certain effects. We also exclude such outliers as bidding more than own valuations in first-price auctions and bidding
irrationally high bids in third-price auctions with small valuations.
37 The unit in their experiments is the dollar. In experimental auctions, if Bob (hypothetical name) is assigned a valuation of 25.42
dollars in a specific round of the auction experiment, and he won the first-price auction with his bid of 15.00 dollars, then he receives
25.24 - 15.00 = 10.24 dollars.
38 For details about the strict monotonicity restriction in estimation, see Chernozhukov, Fernadez-Val, and Galichon (2009) [7].
39 We thank Charles Noussair and Jonathon Silver for providing the dataset for this project. Since all-pay auctions have such important
applications as research and development races, their experimental results have important implications in real world contest designs.
40 Noussair and Silver (2006) used their own experimental monetary unit of 1000 = 4 dollars.
41 Of interest, most of the participants left the experiment with fewer than 20 dollars. This means that participants, on average, lost
money during series of all-pay auctions experiments.
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Figure 7: Estimation Outline
6.2 Estimation Method
Our estimation is based on the Hotz and Miller (1993)[25] method42, which is widely used in the empirical industrial
organization literature. The econometric method proposed by Hotz and Miller (1993) has an advantage in that we
can avoid computations to solve out equilibrium policy functions. Policy functions are biding functions in our auc-
tion setting. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first application of the Hotz and Miller (1993) method
to experimental auction data. Here, we summarize the estimation procedure with first-, second-, and third-price
auction data from Kagel and Levin (1993) [27] 4344. The estimation takes five steps:
Step 1:
We assume that the estimated bidding functions converge to the true equilibrium bidding functions. Then, we
estimate the equilibrium bidding functions with high oder polynomials, βˆIn=5, βˆ
I
n=10, βˆ
II
n=5, βˆ
II
n=10, βˆ
III
n=5, and βˆ
III
n=10.
Note that these estimated biding functions are already plotted in Figures 1, 3, and 4 in the introductory section
(Section 1).
Step 2:
We substitute estimated equilibrium bidding functions into the first-order conditions in Propositions 1, 2, and 4. We
denote a first order condition function as φ. We interpret the first-order conditions as follows; bidders minimize their
expected regret given that other bidders in experiments employ an estimated bidding function as an equilibrium
bidding function.
42 The empirical auction estimation method proposed by Guerre, Perrigne, Vuong (2000, 2009) also motivated our research.
43 Yoshimoto (2011)[41] describes in detail the estimation method with experimental auction data.
44 We use data from Noussair and Silver (2006) [34] for comparison purposes in the next section, and they are not used in estimation.
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Step 3:
We assume bidders in auction experiments are homogeneous. However, they make mean zero optimization errors
when they chose bids (or solve first-order conditions),
φ
(
x, b|βˆ; θ
)
+ ε = 0,
where E[ε|x] = 045. We use the first order conditions as moment conditions, and estimate structural parameters.
Denoting the vector of parameters θ = (γw, γl, α, J). In addition, φ
K
n=L(x
K
n=L,i, b
K
n=L,i|β
K
n=L : θ) represents a first-
order condition in format K auction with n = L bidders with observed data (xKn=L,i, b
K
n=L,i), given an equilibrium
strategy βˆKn=L. The vector moment function Φ is constructed as
Φ︸︷︷︸
6×1 vector
=


(
N In=5
)−1∑NIn=5
i=1 φ
I
n=5
(
xIn=5,i, b
I
n=5,i|βˆ
I
n=5; θ
)
(
N In=10
)−1∑NIn=10
i=1 φ
I
n=10
(
xIn=10,i, b
I
n=10,i|βˆ
I
n=10; θ
)
(
N IIn=5
)−1∑NIIn=5
i=1 φ
II
n=5
(
xIIn=5,i, b
II
n=5,i|βˆ
II
n=5; θ
)
(
N IIn=10
)−1∑NIIn=10
i=1 φ
II
n=10
(
xIIn=10,i, b
II
n=10,i|βˆ
II
n=10; θ
)
(
N IIIn=5
)−1∑NIIIn=5
i=1 φ
III
n=5
(
xIIIn=5,i, b
III
n=5,i|βˆ
III
n=5; θ
)
(
N IIIn=10
)−1∑NIIIn=10
i=1 φ
III
n=10
(
xIIIn=10,i, b
III
n=10,i|βˆ
III
n=10; θ
)


where N In=5, N
I
n=10, N
II
n=5, N
II
n=10, N
III
n=5, and N
III
n=10 denotes number of observations in first-, second-, and third-
aucton experiments46. We call the above object as pseudo-GMM moment function.
Step 4:
We apply the pseudo-GMM estimation to obtain the estimate of θ,
θˆ = argmin
θ
{
Φ′V −1Φ
}
where V is the diagonal variance matrix obtained by a similar way as two-step GMM estimation method47.
Step 5:
Bootstraps are implemented to obtain confidence interval of parameter θ
45 Using first-order conditions as moment conditions is a commonly applied method in the Macro literature. Hansen and Singleton
(1982) use the Euler condition, which is a dynamic optimization first order condition, as a GMM moment condition.
46 This object is not a conventional Generalize Method of Moment (GMM) moment vector, since each element of the moment
vector consists with the summation across a specific type of auction experiment. This unusual moment condition setting is due to the
construction of the dataset. We do not observe bidders’ identity across different types (rules) of auction experiments. For this reason,
the standard GMM variance formula cannot be used in this research. See details in Yoshimoto (2011) [41].
47 Note that we are unable to recover off-diagonal elements of V , since the dataset does not track identities across different types of
auction experiments.
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Table 1: Estimated parameters and bootstrapped confidence intervals
Parameter Estimate
(95% confidence interval)
α: Risk-Averse (CARA) 0.1624
(0.3459, 0.0001)
γw: Winner-Regret 0.1329
(0.2941, 0.0000)
γl: Loser-Regret 0.4912
(0.7539, 0.2383)
J : Joy of Winning 0.9386
(0.0792, 0.0121)
6.3 Estimation Results and Hypothesis Tests
We use the CARA payoff function u(z) = 1
α
[1− exp(−α ·z)] and the index regret functions in our estimation. In the
estimation, we use the scale of U [0, 28.3] dollars, which is the scale used in Kagel and Levin (1993)[27]’s experiments,
and normalizations are not applied. Estimation results are shown in Table 148. We interpret these estimates by
hypothesis tests in the next subsection.
6.4 Hypothesis Testings
We analyze each hypothesis step-by-step with interpretation of bidders’ behaviors.
Hypothesis 1: Regret-Averse Attitude
The sum of the winner and loser regret-averse parameters is significantly larger than zero49, and the non-existence
of regret-averse attitudes is rejected. In other words, there exist regret-averse attitudes among bidders in Kagel and
Levin (1993)[27]’s experiments.
Hypothesis 2: Symmetry in Winner and Loser Regret-Averse Attitudes
The difference between loser and winner regret-averse parameters is significantly larger than zero50. This means
that bidders avoid loser regrets more than they avoid winner regrets. Note that this testing result is consistent with
findings reported by Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) [18].
Hypothesis 3: Risk-Averse Attitude
The CARA risk-averse parameter α is not significantly different from 0, which means bidders in Kagel-Levin (1993)
experiments do not significantly exhibit risk-averse attitudes. This result meets expectations since bidders in third-
price auctions behave opposite to the risk-averse preference theory’s prediction.
Hypothesis 4: Joy of Winning
48 In estimation and bootstrap, we put the restrictions α > 0, γw ≥ 0, and γl ≥ 0 in the minimizing algorithm. We put these restrictions
into matlab constrained minimization subroutines. These restrictions come from the common sense of real-world observations as we
exclude the possibilities of risk-loving and regret-loving agents. Bootstrapped parameters αˆ and γˆw , computed by minimization algorithm
with non-negative restriction, tend to stack in zeros. This is why we have lower 5 percent of the bootstrapped quantile is 0.0000.
49 We implement bootstraps 843 times to obtain the bootstrapped distribution of (αˆw + αˆl). The lower 2.5 percent quantile is 0.2914.
50 We compute the bootstrapped distribution of (αˆl − αˆw). The lower 2.5 percent quantile is 0.0903.
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Joy of Winning parameter J is significantly larger than 0, indicating that bidders in the experiment obtain payoffs
from their winning status. We are not surprised by this testing result, considering that overbidding in the second-
price auctions is commonly observed in the experimental auction literature.
These results from the hypothesis tests indicate the following conclusions. The loser regret-averse attitude, rather
than risk-averse attitude, caused the overbidding observed across Independent Private Value (IPV) auctions. Bid-
ders in Kagel and Levin (1993) auction experiments try to avoid their loser regrets, the avoidance of losing attainable
positive payoffs. Compared to loser regret, winner regret plays a relatively small role when bidders make their bid
choices. In addition, unlike the conventional theoretical and experimental auction literature, a risk-averse attitude
does not have significant impact in the explanation of overbidding. Rather, bidders’ risk-averse attitudes are close to
risk-neutral. This insignificance of risk-averse attitude is expected because of the contradictions between observed
overbidding in experiments and theoretical predictions in third-price and all-pay auctions.
7 Counterfactual Analysis: Calibrations and Revenue Rankings
In this section, we calibrate (approximate) equilibrium bidding functions and compute a seller’s expected revenues in
Independent Private Value (IPV) first-, second-, third-, and all-pay auctions. Then, we construct revenue rankings.
Throughout this section, we use the estimated parameters in Table 1.
7.1 Calibrating Equilibrium Bidding Functions
In order to compute the seller’s expected revenues, we need to obtain equilibrium bidding functions for each auction
format. We apply the calibration (approximation) method with the parameters listed in Table 1. Bajari (2001) [1]
proposed the methodology used in this section, and we follow his method. The calibration procedures are as follows:
Step 1:
we prepare a high order polynomial function51 with the strict monotonicity assumption to approximate equilibrium
bidding functions. We denote arbitrary coefficients of the Kth order polynomial as a = (a0, a1, . . . , aK). In addition,
we denote the polynomial function as
fk(x; a) = a0 + a1x+ a2x
2 + · · ·+ akx
k (approximating an equilibirum bidding function).
Step 2:
We assume valuations are drawn from U [0, x¯], and we define G+1 grid52 on the [0, x¯].
Step 3:
We plug estimated parameters θˆ = (αˆ, γˆw, γˆl, Jˆ) in Table 1, and a polynomial (which approximates an equilibrium
bidding function) into a first-order condition equation φ. Then, we evaluate first order condition values at each grid
with values of (xg, fk(xg; a)) where g indexes grids.
51 We use 6th to 10th order polynomials in the calibration computation. For all-pay auctions, we exceptionally use 18th order
polynomials.
52 We set up G = 1, 000. Computation time significantly increases if one uses a larger number of grids such as G = 5, 000 or 10, 000.
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Step 4:
Computing a following minimizing object, which is the summation of first order condition values at each grid point,
G∑
g=0
φ(xg , fK(xg ; a))|fk(a); θˆ).
Step 5:
We minimize the above object with respect to coefficients of polynomial, a. This means that we search over the
coefficients a = (a1, a2, . . . , aK) of arbitrary polynomial function fK(x; a), in order to find an equilibrium bidding
function that fits a first order condition φ.
Step 6:
We draw random numbers from the uniform distribution U [0, x¯], and compute an expected revenue using the
calibrated bidding function in Step 5.
7.2 Calibration Results and Revenue Rankings
Figures 8, 9 and 10 depict calibration results with observed bids in experiments.
Figure 8 illustrates that, with our risk- & regret-averse criterion, overbidding happens in first- and second-price
auctions. Figure 9, which contains the calibration results of third-price auctions, illustrates that bidders overbid
in the area of low valuations (in the case of five bidders) and in the entire area of valuations (in the case of ten
bidders). Such overbidding in third-price auctions is not expected if one adheres to the risk-averse preference. In
Figure 10, we see the substantial overbidding in all-pay auctions among bidders who have high valuations. The
strong loser regret, the avoidance of losing potentially positive payoffs when bidders have high valuations, causes
this overbidding in all pay auctions. As every bidder pays the amount of her bid, the overbidding in all-pay auctions
has significant effects on revenues.
Table 2 contains calibrated revenues generated with the bidder valuation distribution of U [0, 28.3], as used
in Kagel and Levin (1993) [27]. For comparison purposes, we also denote average of observed revenues in their
experiments53. Furthermore, in order to make comparisons with other reported revenues in the literature, we
normalize the revenues by simply dividing them by 28.3. Table 2 confirms that the all-pay auction provides highest
revenue in both five- and ten-bidder auctions. The all-pay auction supremacy in revenues has been reported in
earlier experiments conducted by Noussair and Silver (2006) [34] and Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006) [22]. We
believe our result structurally confirms their experimental findings. For five-bidder auctions, the calibrated revenue
ranking is
RAPr&ra > R
I
r&ra > R
II
r&ra > R
III
r&ra (case of n = 5)
that agrees with observed revenues in experiments54. For ten-bidder auctions, our numerical calibration results
53 In order to remove learning and certain effects, we removed data from initial 4 rounds and final 2 rounds from the dataset provided
by Kagel and Levin (1993) [27]. Also, outliers, such as non-serious bids (bidding equal or close to zero), are removed.
54 Due to the absence of all-pay auction experiments in Kagel and Levin (1993) [27], we cannot compare calibrated all-play auction
revenues with observed revenue in experiments. For the reference value of revenue, Noussair and Silver (2006) [34] report that the
average revenues in their six bidder (N=6) all-pay auction experiments was 1.0855. This means that bidders in the all-pay auction
experiments, on average, obtained negative payment gains. Note that participation fees compensated for such negative gains.
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(a) First-Price Calibration: Five Bidders Case
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(b) First-Price Calibration: with Ten Bidder Case
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(c) Second-Price Calibration: Five Bidders Case
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(d) Second-Price Calibration: with Ten Bidder Case
demonstrate that
RAPr&ra > R
II
r&ra > R
I
r&ra > R
III
r&ra (case of n = 10).
This ten-bidder revenue ranking does not perfectly agree with the experimentally observed revenues in Kagel and
Levin (1993) [27]. However, differences among experimentally observed revenues in ten-bidder auctions are quite
small.
Last, our risk- & regret-averse model contrasts to the risk-averse model in all-pay auction revenues. With a
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(a) Third-Price Calibration: Five Bidders Case
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(b) Third-Price Calibration: with Ten Bidder Case
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(a) All-Pay Calibration: Five Bidders Case
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(b) All-Pay Calibration: with Ten Bidder Case
uniform distribution55, the risk-averse preference model predicts (also computed in Table 2) a revenue ranking of
RIra > R
II
ra > R
III
ra > R
AP
ra ,
55 In general, revenue rankings depend on valuation distributions. We restrict our research to uniform distributions that are commonly
assumed in the experimental auction literature.
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Table 2: Expected Revenue in Independent Private Value Auctions with Five and Ten Bidders
Five Bidder Auctions Expected revenue Theoretical expected Theoretical expected Average of observed
(N=5) risk- & regret-averse revenue: risk-averse revenue: risk-neutral revenue in experiment
Rr&ra Rra Rrn Rˆ
First-Price (I) 0.7124 0.7636 0.6666 0.7425
Second-Price (II) 0.6998 0.6666 0.6666 0.6879
Third-Price (III) 0.6459 0.6530 0.6666 0.6492
All-Pay (AP) 0.7592 0.6402 0.6666 N.A.
Ten Bidder Auctions Expected revenue Theoretical expected Theoretical expected Average of observed
(N = 10) risk- & regret-averse revenue: risk-averse revenue: risk-neutral revenue in experiment
Rr&ra Rra Rrn Rˆ
First-Price (I) 0.8309 0.8613 0.8181 0.8312
Second-Price (II) 0.8523 0.8181 0.8181 0.8215
Third-Price (III) 0.8244 0.7676 0.8181 0.8378
All-Pay (AP) 0.9030 0.6779 0.8181 N.A.
Note: We first compute all revenue calculations with the U [0, 28.3] distribution as in Kagel and Levin (1993), and
then normalize them by dividing by 28.3.
Risk-averse revenues are calculated with CARA risk-averse parameter = 1.25.
and all-pay auctions generate the worst revenues. Such revenue predictions based on risk-averse preference are
inconsistent with findings in experiments, as noted in the introductory section (Section 1).
8 Conclusions and Extensions
In this research, we propose and investigate the risk- & regret-averse model that nests the risk-averse and risk-
neutral preference models. We found that the loser regret-averse attitude, rather than risk-averse attitude, caused the
overbidding observed across Independent Private Value (IPV) auction experiments. The proposed model contributes
to the literature in both qualitative and quantitative ways. In the qualitative sense, the model generates overbidding
across a wide class of auctions. In the quantitative sense, the model confirms the revenue supremacy in all-pay
auctions. These qualitative and quantitative results contrast with the risk-averse preference model that predicts
underbidding in some auctions.
There are asymmetric and common-value extensions of this research (see the online Appendix for the derivations
of first-order conditions). The experimental auction literature reports several interesting findings that may fit our
risk- & regret-averse model. First, Chernomaz (2011) [6] reports the observance of overbidding in his asymmet-
ric first-price auction experiments. Note that, in his experiment, weak bidders (whose valuation distribution is
stochastically dominated by those of other bidders and who are more likely to lose) overbid more aggressively than
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other types of bidders do, even after accounting for risk aversions. Second, there is the well-known “winners’ curse”
problem in the experimental common-value auction literature. Kagel and Levin (1986) [26] report that bidders in
common-value auction experiments overbid, and winners tend to receive negative payoffs56. Motivated by these ex-
perimental results, we are currently investigating the implications of our risk- & regret-averse model in asymmetric
and common-value auctions.
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Appendix A: Derivations of First Order Necessary Conditions
First-Price Auction
In a first-price auction, a bidder i who has a signal x solves her regret minimization problem, which is
b∗ = argmin
b∈R+
{
Ex−i [R
I(b, x,x−i|β)]
}
where
Ex−i [R
I(b, x,x−i|β)] = Ex−i [WR
I(b, x,x−i|β)] + Ex−i [LR
I(b, x,x−i|β)]
=
∫ b
β(0)
[v(x − β1 + J)− v(x − b+ J)]
1+γw h1(β1)dβ1
+
∫ x+J
b
[v(x− β1 + J)− v(0)]
1+γl h1(β1)dβ1
where h1(·) is an unconditional density function of β1, a highest bid among other bidders. By taking derivative with
respect to b, we obtain
(1 + γw)v
′
(x− b+ J)
∫ b
β(0)
[v(x− β1 + J)− v(x− b+ J)]
γw h1(β1)dβ1
− [v(x− b+ J)− v(0)]1+γlh1(b) = 0
Next, we change variables. Since other bidders employ an equilibrium bidding strategy β, we have the relation
β1 = β(y1) and dβ1 = β
′
(y1)dy1. Also h1(·) is derived by (where H1 is the distribution function of β1)
h1(β1) =
dH1(β1)
dβ1
=
dH1(β1)
dy1
dy1
dβ1
=
dF (y1)
n−1
dy1
1
dβ1
dy1
= (n− 1)f(y1)F (y1)
n−2 1
β
′(y1)
,
where we use the relation (assuming B1 is a random variable of β1)
H1(β1) = H1(β(y1)) = Pr(B1 < β(y1)) = Pr(β
−1(B1) < y1) = F (y1)
n−1.
An integrating region changes from β(0)↔ b to 0↔ β−1(b). By substituting and canceling out, we obtain
(1 + γw)v
′(x− b+ J)
∫ β−1(b)
0
[v(x− β(y1) + J)− v(x − b+ J)]
γw
=g1(y1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(n− 1)f(y1)F (y1)
n−2(y1)dy1︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal expected winner regret=MEWR(b,x|β)
−[v(x− b+ J)− v(0)]1+γl
=g1(β
−1(b))︷ ︸︸ ︷
(n− 1)f(β−1(b))F (β−1(b))n−2
1
β′(β−1(b))︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal expected loser regret=MELR(b,x|β)
= 0.
By replacing (n− 1)f(·)F (·) by g1(·) and substituting b = β(x), we obtain the equation in proposition 2.
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All-Pay Auction
In an all-pay auction, a bidder i who has a signal x solves her regret minimization problem, which is
b∗ = argmin
b∈R+
{
Ex−i [R
AP(b, x,x−i|β)]
}
where
Ex−i [R
AP(b, x,x−i|β)] = Ex−i [WR
AP(b, x,x−i|β)] + Ex−i [LR
AP
TypeA(b, x,x−i|β)] +Ex−i [LR
AP
TypeB(b, x,x−i|β)]
=
∫ b
β(0)
[v(x− β1 + J)− v(x− b+ J)]
1+γw h1(β1)dβ1
+
∫ x+J
b
[v(x− β1 + J)− v(−b)]
1+γl h1(β1)dβ1
+
∫ β(x¯)
x+J
[v(0)− v(−b)]1+γl h1(β1)dβ1
=
∫ b
β(0)
[v(x− β1 + J)− v(x− b+ J)]
1+γw h1(β1)dβ1
−
∫ b
x+J
[v(x− β1 + J)− v(−b)]
1+γl h1(β1)dβ1
+ [v(0)− v(−b)]1+γl
∫ β(x¯)
x+J
h1(β1)dβ1
where h1(·) is an unconditional density of β1, a highest bid among other bidders. By taking derivative with respect
to b, we obtain
(1 + γw)v
′(x− b+ J)
∫ b
β(0)
[v(x− β1 + J)− v(x− b+ J)]
γw h1(β1)dβ1 (28)
− [v(x − b+ J)− v(−b)]
1+γl h1(b) (29)
+(1 + γl)v
′(−b)
∫ x+J
b
[v(x− β1 + J)− v(−b)]
γl h1(β1)dβ1 (30)
+(1 + γl)v
′(−b) [v(0)− v(−b)]
γl
∫ β(x¯)
x+J
h1(β1)dβ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−H1(x+J)
= 0 (31)
Next, we change variables57. Since other bidders employ an equilibrium bidding strategy β, we have the relation
β1 = β(y1) and dβ1 = β
′
(y1)dy1. Also h1(·) is derived by (where H1 is the distribution function of β1)
h1(β1) =
dH1(β1)
dβ1
=
dH1(β1)
dy1
dy1
dβ1
=
dF (y1)
n−1
dy1
1
dβ1
dy1
= (n− 1)f(y1)F (y1)
n−2 1
β
′(y1)
,
where we use the relation (assuming B1 is a random variable of β1)
H1(β1) = H1(β(y1)) = Pr(B1 < β(y1)) = Pr(β
−1(B1) < y1) = F (y1)
n−1.
Similarly, H1(x + J) is derived by (assuming Y1 is a random variable of y1)
H1(x+ J) = Pr(B1 < x+ J) = Pr(β
−1(B1) < β
−1(x+ J)) = Pr(Y1 < β
−1(x+ J)) = F (β−1(x + J))n−1
57 The change of variables discussion here is almost identical to the case of first-price auction first order condition derivation.
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Also, integrating region changes from β(0) ↔ b to 0 ↔ β−1(b) for the first integral and b ↔ x + J to β−1(b) ↔
β−1(x + J) for the second integral. By substituting and canceling, we obtain.
(1 + γw)v
′(x− b + J)
∫ β−1(b)
0
[v(x− β(y1) + J)− v(x − b+ J)]
γw (n− 1)f(y1)F (y1)
n−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=g1(y1)
dy1
− [v(x− b+ J)− v(−b)]1+γl (n− 1)f(β−1(b))F (β−1(b))n−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=g1(β−1(b))
1
β
′(β−1(b))
+(1 + γl)v
′(−b)
∫ β−1(x+J)
β−1(b)
[v(x− β(y1) + J)− v(−b)]
γl (n− 1)f(y1)F (y1)
n−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=g1(y1)
dy1
+(1 + γl)v
′(−b) [v(0)− v(−b)]
γl [1− F (β−1(x+ J))n−1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−G1(β−1(x+J))
= 0
Furthermore, by introducing short hand notations g1(·) = (n−1)f(·)F (·)
n−1 and G1(·) = F (·)
n−1, and by arranging,
we have
(1 + γw)v
′(x− b+ J)
∫ β−1(b)
0
[v(x− β(y1) + J)− v(x − b+ J)]
γw g1(y1)dy1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal expected winner regret=MEWRAP(b,x|β)
− [v(x − b+ J)− v(−b)]1+γl g1(β
−1(b))
1
β
′ (β−1(b))
+ (1 + γl)v
′(−b)
∫ β−1(x+J)
β−1(b)
[v(x− β(y1) + J)− v(−b)]
γl g1(y1)dy1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal expected Type I loser regret=MELRAP
Type I
(b,x|β)
+(1 + γl)v
′(−b) [v(0) − v(−b)]γl [1−G1(β
−1(x+ J))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal expected Type II loser regret=MELRAP
Type II
(b,x|β)
= 0.
By substituting b = β(x), we obtain the equation in Proposition 3.
8.1 Third-Price Auction (TPA)
Finally58, we analyze a third-price auction which is originally proposed for the theoretical investigation purposes59.
Although a third-price auction only exists in theoretical and experimental environments, it gives us interesting
equilibrium analysis. Since a winner pays a third highest bid, payoffs in the third-price auction are specified by
u(b, x,x−i|β) =


v(x − β2 + J) if β1 < b︸ ︷︷ ︸
win
v(0) if b < β1︸ ︷︷ ︸
lose
where β2 = β(y2) and y2 is the second highest signal among x−i. We can define wnning and loser regret in the
following manners.
58This subsection can be skepped if a reader is not interested in a third-price auction.
59 More generally, a k-th price auction where k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, · · · , n−1, n are investigated by Monderer and Tennenholtz (2000 )[31].
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TPA Winner Regret
WRIII(b, x,x−i|β) =



 v(x− β2 + J)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex-post best payoff
− v(x − β2 + J)︸ ︷︷ ︸
realized payoff


1+γw
= 0 if β1 < b and β2 < x+ J︸ ︷︷ ︸
affordable
 v(0)︸︷︷︸
ex-post best payoff
− v(x − β2 + J)︸ ︷︷ ︸
realized payoff


1+γw
if β1 < b and β2 > x+ J︸ ︷︷ ︸
unaffordable
(32)
The first row is an affordable case in which a bidder i wins an auction. The payment, second highest bid among
others, is less than her valuation plus joy of winning (x + J). In this case, she has no regret since her ex-post best
payoff is already attained. The second row is a winner regret which is specific to a third-price auction. It is an
unaffordable case in which a bidder i wins auction but payment (which is β2) exceeds x+ J . In such a case, losing
an auction is ex-post optimal to her and ex-post best payoff is v(0).
TPA Loser Regret
LRIII(b, x,x−i|β) =



 v(x − β2 + J)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex-post best payoff
− v(0)︸︷︷︸
realized payoff


1+γl
if β1 > b and β2 < x+ J︸ ︷︷ ︸
affordable
 v(0)︸︷︷︸
ex-post best payoff
− v(0)︸︷︷︸
realized payoff


1+γl
= 0 if β1 > b and β2 > x+ J︸ ︷︷ ︸
unaffordable
(33)
The first row is the case of underpricing in which a bidder loses but she can obtain an object with a positive payoff.
In this case, expost-best payoff is attained by bidding β2. The second row is the case in which a bidder loses and an
object is unaffordable to her afterall. Given other bidders employ bidding function β, expected regret in a third-price
auction takes a form
Ex−i [R
III(b, x,x−i|β)] = Ex−i [WR
III(b, x,x−i|β)] + Ex−i [LR
III(b, x,x−i|β)] (34)
where
Ex−i [WR
III(b, x,x−i|β)] =
∫ b
x+J
∫ b
β2
[v(0)− v(x− β2 + J)]
1+γw h1,2(β1, β2)∂β1∂β2
Ex−i [LR
III(b, x,x−i|β)] =
∫ x+J
β(0)
∫ β(x¯)
b
[v(x − β2 + J)− v(0)]
1+γl h1,2(β1, β2)∂β1∂β2
and h1,2(β1, β2) is the joint distribution of β1 and β2. Taking derivative of equation (34) and substituting the
symmetric equilibrium condition b = β(x) provide the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Symmetric Third-Price Auction Equilibrium
In the IPV third-price auction, the symmetric equilibrium bidding function βIII satisfies
MELRIII(βIII(x), x|βIII) = −MEWRIII(βIII(x), x|βIII) (35)
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for all x ∈ [0, x¯]60, where the precise form of the equation is
∫ βIII,−1(x+J)
0
[
v(x− βIII(y2) + J)− v(0)
]1+γl
f(y2)F (y2)
n−3∂y2
=
∫ x
βIII,−1(x+J)
[
v(0)− v(x− βIII(y2) + J)
]1+γw
f(y2)F (y2)
n−3∂y2
Case 3 If γw = γl = 0 (regret-neutral), J = 0 (no joy of winner), and v(z) = z (risk-neutral) the equation in
proposition 4 becomes
βIII(x) = x+
1
n− 2
F (x)
f(x)
which is the well-known risk-neutral BNE in an third-price auction.
Third-Price Auction
In a third-price auction, a bidder i who has a signal x solves her regret minimization problem, which is
b∗ = argmin
b∈R+
{
Ex−i [R
III(b, x,x−i|β)]
}
where
Ex−i [R
III(b, x,x−i|β)] = Ex−i [WR
III(b, x,x−i|β)] + Ex−i [LR
III(b, x,x−i|β)]
=
∫ b
x+J
∫ b
β2
[v(0)− v(x− β2 + J)]
1+γw h1,2(β1, β2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=h1|2(β1|β2)h2(β2)
∂β1∂β2
+
∫ x+J
β(0)
∫ β(x¯)
b
[v(x − β2 + J)− v(0)]
1+γl h1,2(β1, β2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=h1|2(β1|β2)h2(β2)
∂β1∂β2
where h1,2(·, ·) is an unconditional joint density of β1 and β2, a highest and a second highest bid among other
bidders. Decomposing a joint density function as h1,2(β1, β2) = h1|2(β1|β2)h2(β2), we obtain and by arranging
=
∫ b
x+J
[v(0)− v(x − β2 + J)]
1+γw
[∫ b
β2
h1|2(β1|β2)∂β1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
integrating
h2(β2)∂β2
+
∫ x+J
β(0)
[v(x− β2 + J)− v(0)]
1+γl
[∫ β(x¯)
b
h1|2(β1|β2)∂β1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
integrating
h2(β2)∂β2
=
∫ b
x+J
[v(0)− v(x − β2 + J)]
1+γw
[
H1|2(b|β2)−H1|2(β2|β2)
]
h2(β2)∂β2
+
∫ x+J
β(0)
[v(x− β2 + J)− v(0)]
1+γl
[
1−H1|2(b|β2)
]
h2(β2)∂β2.
60 We use the equation (35) as a moment condition in empirical section.
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next, by taking derivative with respect to b, we obtain∫ b
x+J
[v(0)− v(x− β2 + J)]
1+γw h1|2(b|β2)h2(β2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=h2|1(β2|b)h1(b)
∂β2
−
∫ x+J
β(0)
[v(x − β2 + J)− v(0)]
1+γl h1|2(b|β2)h2(β2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=h2|1(β2|b)h1(b)
∂β2 = 0.
Now, by manipulating a conditional density function as h1|2(b|β2)h2(β2) = h1,2(b, β2) = h2|1(β2|b)h1(b), we have∫ b
x+J
[v(0)− v(x − β2 + J)]
1+γw h2|1(β2|b) h1(b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cancel out
∂β2
−
∫ x+J
β(0)
[v(x− β2 + J)− v(0)]
1+γl h2|1(β2|b) h1(b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cancel out
∂β2 = 0.
Next, we change variables. Since other bidders employ bidding function β, we have the relation β2 = β(y2) and
∂β2 = β
′(y2)∂y2. Also, h2|1(·) is deived by (where denoting H2|1(·|·) is a corresponding conditional distribution
function)
h2|1(β2|b) =
∂H2|1(β2|b)
∂β2
=
∂H2|1(β2|b)
∂y2
∂y2
∂β2
=
∂F2|1(y2|β
−1(b))
∂y2
1
∂β
∂y2
= f2|1(y2|β
−1(b))
1
∂β
∂y2
=
(n− 2)f(y2)F (y2)
n−3
F (β−1(b))n−2
1
β′(y2)
where we use the relation (denoting B2 as a random variable of β2)
H2|1(β2|b) = Pr(B2 < β2|b) = Pr(B2 < β(y2)|b) = Pr(β
−1(B2) < y2|β
−1(b)) = F2|1(y2|β
−1(b)).
Integrating regions change from x+ J ↔ b to β−1(x+ J)↔ β−1(b) for the first integral and from β(0)↔ x+ J to
0↔ β−1(x+ J) for the second integral. By substituting, we obtain
∫ β−1(b)
β−1(x+J)
[v(0)− v(x− β(y2) + J)]
1+γw (n− 2)f(y2)F (y2)
n−3
F (β−1(b))n−2
1
β′(y2)
β′(y2)∂y2
−
∫ β−1(x+J)
0
[v(x − β(y2) + J)− v(0)]
1+γl (n− 2)f(y2)F (y2)
n−3
F (β−1(b))n−2
1
β′(y2)
β′(y2)∂y2 = 0
By canceling outs, we have
∫ β−1(b)
β−1(x+J)
[v(0)− v(x− β(y2) + J)]
1+γw f(y2)F (y2)
n−3∂y2︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal expected winner regret =MEWRIII(b,x|β)
−
∫ β−1(x+J)
0
[v(x − β(y2) + J)− v(0)]
1+γl f(y2)F (y2)
n−3∂y2︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal expected loser regret =MELRIII(b,x|β)
= 0.
By substituting b = β(x), we obtain the equation in Proposition 4.
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